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In a recent work, Markham and Sanders have proposed a framework to study quantum secret sharing (QSS)
schemes using graph states. This framework unified three classes of QSS protocols, namely, sharing classical
secrets over private and public channels, and sharing quantum secrets. However, most work on secret sharing
based on graph states focused on threshold schemes. In this paper, we focus on general access structures. We
show how to realize a large class of arbitrary access structures using the graph state formalism. We show an
equivalence between [[n, 1]] binary quantum codes and graph state secret sharing schemes sharing one bit. We
also establish a similar (but restricted) equivalence between a class of [[n, 1]] Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS)
codes and graph state QSS schemes sharing one qubit. With these results we are able to construct a large class
of quantum secret sharing schemes with arbitrary access structures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum secret sharing (QSS) [2, 8] deals with the problem
of sharing classical or quantum secrets using quantum infor-
mation. Further, the secret sharing protocol could be operated
in the presence or absence of eavesdroppers. In [12], a graph
state formalism was proposed with a view to unifying all these
variants under the same umbrella. This framework was useful
in ways other than unifying the various quantum secret shar-
ing protocols. For instance, building upon this framework,
researchers have been able to propose new secret sharing pro-
tocols [9], and make a connection with the measurment-based
quantum computation model [10]. More recently, it has mo-
tivated research in graph theoretic concepts such as weak odd
domination [6].
The graph state framework does in principle include non-
threshold access structures for quantum secrets. However,
neither [12] nor subsequent works [6, 9–11] provide any pro-
cedure to explicitly construct schemes with arbitrary access
structures in the graph state formalism. The graph state frame-
work in for quantum secret sharing approaches it from a per-
spective other than quantum error-correction, in contrast to the
theory as developed in [2, 4, 15]. But since any secret sharing
protocol is ultimately an error-correcting code, the graph state
schemes must be equivalent to those based on stabilizer codes
and the protocols in [12] must arise from quantum codes. But
no results are known in this direction.
The main contribution of this paper is to fill these gaps.
We make transparent the connection between the graph state
framework and the protocols presented using quantum codes.
We show an equivalence between [[n, 1]] binary quantum
codes and graph state protocols sharing one bit. We show
a restricted equivalence between a class of [[n, 1]] CSS codes
[1] and protocols sharing one qubit. We also translate many of
the schemes developed using quantum codes into those based
on the graph state formalism.
We emphasize that our results are constructive and pro-
vide concrete details for the construction of the secret sharing
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schemes as well as the associated details of recovery.
We restrict ourselves to the qubit case in this paper, al-
though as shown in [11] graph state secret sharing schemes
can be extended to other alphabet. The general case involving
qudits will be explored elsewhere.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Quantum secret sharing
We briefly review the pertinent ideas of quantum secret
sharing. We assume that the reader is familiar with quantum
codes and the stabilizer formalism [1, 3]. In a secret sharing
scheme, a dealer distributes an encrypted secret to a collection
of players. Then certain subsets of players can collaboratively
reconstruct the secret. Those subsets which can recover the
secret are called authorized sets and those that cannot are said
to be unauthorized sets. The collection of authorized sets is
called the access structure of the scheme, which we denote as
Γ. For an access structure to be valid, it must be monotonic,
i.e., any set that contains an authorized set must also be an
authorized set. An authorized set is said to be minimal if any
proper subset of it is unauthorized. The collection of minimal
authorized sets is called the minimal access structure. In a
threshold scheme with threshold k, any subset consisting of k
or more players can access the secret while those with fewer
players cannot. In a general access structure, the authorized
sets can be of different sizes and all subsets of that size need
not be authorized. A collection of sets Γgen is said to generate
the access structure Γ, if every authorized set contains some
element of Γgen.
A secret sharing scheme is said to be perfect if the unautho-
rized sets cannot extract any information about the secret. In
this paper we only consider perfect secret sharing schemes.
When the secret to be shared is classical, the dealer dis-
tributes a set of orthogonal quantum states that encode the se-
cret. The following result, due to Gottesman, states the con-
ditions that must be satisfied by authorized and unauthorized
sets for sharing classical secrets through a QSS scheme.
2Proposition 1 (Access conditions for classical secrets, [4]).
Suppose we have a set of orthonormal states |ψi〉 encoding a
classical secret. Then a set T is an unauthorized set iff
〈ψi|F |ψi〉 = c(F ) (1)
independent of i for all operators F on T . The set T is autho-
rized iff
〈ψi|E|ψj〉 = 0 (i 6= j) (2)
for all operators E on the complement of T .
If we were to share a quantum secret, then the access struc-
ture, in addition to being monotonic, must also satisfy the no-
cloning theorem [2]. This implies that no two authorized sets
are disjoint. In this case the access structure must satisfy the
conditions of Proposition 1 for any state in the space spanned
by the encoded states, see [4, Theorem 1].
B. Review of graph state formalism for quantum secret
sharing
In [12], the quantum secret sharing protocols were classi-
fied as follows: i) CC–This protocol deals with the sharing
of classical secrets, where we assume that the players have
secure channels. ii) CQ–In this protocol we share classical
secrets where we assume that the channels between the play-
ers are susceptible to eavesdropping. iii) QQ–This protocol
shares quantum secrets using quantum channels. In this paper
we restrict our attention to CC and QQ protocols.
Let G be a graph with vertex set V (G). We denote the
neighbours of a vertex v ∈ V (G) as Nv. We denote the graph
obtained by deleting the vertex v from G, by G \ v. The graph
state defined on G is denoted |G〉. Recall that the graph state
is a stabilizer state and satisfies Kv|G〉 = |G〉, where
Kv = Xv
∏
u∈Nv
Zu, for all v ∈ V (G). (3)
We use the notation KA =
∏
i∈AKi. The stabilizer of |G〉 is
denoted as S(|G〉).
In the CC quantum secret sharing protocol, the secret bit s
is encoded as
E : s 7→ ZsA|G〉, (4)
where ZsA =
∏
i∈A Z
s
i . We denote a CC protocol using the
graph G and encoding using the set A by (G, A). An autho-
rized set T can recover the secret by either performing a joint
measurement of an appropriate operator M ∈ S(|G〉) or by
local measurements and combine these results classically (af-
ter classical communication), in other words through LOCC.
In the QQ protocol, the dealer needs to add an additional
ancilla qubit whose state is the secret to be shared. The dealer
then encodes this state by a procedure similar to teleporation.
Following this the dealer might have to perform some correc-
tion operations on the encoded state to ensure that the secret
has been properly teleported. The dealer then distributes the
qubits to the players. In this setting, authorized subsets of
players can reconstruct the secret by means of suitable nonlo-
cal operations.
In [10], the graph state secret sharing schemes were charac-
terized in terms of graphical conditions. Define the odd neigh-
bourhood of a set S ⊆ V (G) as
Odd(S) = {v ∈ V (G) | |Nv ∩D| = 1 mod 2} (5)
Proposition 2 (Authorized sets for CC protocol, [10]). For
the CC classical secret sharing protocols (G,A) of [12], the
secret can be accessed by a set S if there exists D ⊆ S such
that
D ∪Odd(D) ⊆ S (6)
|D ∩ A| = 1 mod 2 (7)
Proposition 3 (Unauthorized sets for CC protocol, [10]). For
the CC classical secret sharing protocols of [12] on G, the
secret cannot be accessed by a set S if there exists a K ∈
V (G) \ S such that
Odd(K) ∩ S = A ∩ S (8)
The authors of [10] proved that these two conditions were
sufficient and made the observation that it was open which
graphs satisfy them. That these conditions are necessary as
well was shown in [9, Lemma 2].
III. GRAPH STATE SCHEME FOR GENERAL ACCESS
STRUCTURES
A. Classical secrets
In this section we make a connection between the CC pro-
tocol in the graph state formalism and the standard error cor-
rection model. We establish a correspondence between all
graph state schemes sharing one bit and [[n, 1]] binary quan-
tum codes. This provides an alternative characterization of the
access structure of the CC secret sharing protocols. Further,
Theorem 1 also generalizes the results of [14], which only
uses CSS codes derived from self-dual codes.
Theorem 1. Let Q be an [[n, 1, d]] quantum code with stabi-
lizer matrix
S =
[
Ir A1 A2 B 0 C
0 0 0 D In−r−1 E
]
, (9)
where diag(B + CAt2) = 0. Then the graph G with the adja-
cency matrix AG
AG =

 B + CA
t
2 A1 A2
At1 0 0
At2 0 0

 , (10)
gives rise to a CC quantum secret sharing protocol with
(G, A), where A = supp([ Ct Et 1 ]). A generating set for
the access structure is given by
Γgen = {supp(g)|g is an encoded Z operator. } (11)
3Proof. One choice of logicalX andZ operators forQ is given
by [
X
Z
]
=
[
0 Et 1 Ct 0 0
0 0 0 At2 0 1
]
. (12)
Let
∣∣0〉 be the state stabilized by S and Z and ∣∣1〉 = X∣∣0〉.
Then I⊗rH⊗n−rXs
∣∣0〉 = ZsA|G〉. Therefore, up to local
Clifford unitaries, the basis states of the CC secret sharing
scheme induced by (G, A) and the basis states ofQ are equiv-
alent. Therefore the secret can be recovered if we can distin-
guish between the states
∣∣0〉 and ∣∣1〉. Consider We can rewrite
the encoding for the CC protocol in terms of the basis states
of Q as follows:
E : s 7→ X
s∣∣0〉 = |ψs〉.
If ω ⊆ {1, . . . , n} contains the support of an encoded Z
operator, then we can recover the secret because ZXs
∣∣0〉 =
(−1)sX
∣∣0〉. Thus the support of any encoded Z operator
gives an authorized set.
If ω does not contain the support of a logical Z operator,
then it is an unauthorized set. Let T be such an operator
such that ω ⊇ supp(T ) 6⊇ supp(ZM), for any M ∈ S.
Let C(S) be the centralizer of S. If T 6∈ C(S), then T
is detectable, therefore 〈ψs|T |ψs〉 = 0. If T ∈ S, then
〈ψs|T |ψs〉 = 1. If T ∈ C(S) \ S and does not contain
the support of an encoded Z operator, then it must be an
encoded X or Y operator. Since |ψs〉 = X
s∣∣0〉, we have
〈ψs|T |ψs〉 =
〈
0
∣∣XsTXs∣∣0〉 = 0, where we used the fact
that T
∣∣0〉 = α∣∣1〉 for some α ∈ C. Therefore, by Lemma 1,
ω is unauthorized. This shows that the access structure gen-
erated by Γgen is complete and must coincide with the access
structure as defined by Propositions 2 and 3.
Remark 1. The requirement that B + CAt2 = 0 is not a re-
striction because any such code can be transformed through
local Clifford unitaries to a code which satisfies this condition.
These two codes will lead to the same access structure.
Our theorem gives a succinct characterization of the access
structure, we just need to specify the stabilizer generators and
the encoded Z operator. All the authorized sets can then be
enumerated easily. There is no need to further check any other
conditions on the sets. But note that our characterization does
not give the minimal access structure but rather a generating
set for the access structure. If we want to obtain the minimal
access structure then we only need to look at those encoded
Z operators which are also minimal in the sense they do not
properly contain any other encoded Z operator within their
support.
Corollary 2. Let G be a connected graph with adjacency ma-
trix AG as in equation (10), where A1, A2 are chosen arbi-
trarily and B + CAt2 is symmetric. Let A be an arbitrary
subset of one of the bipartitions of the graph. Then (G, A) is
a CC quantum secret sharing scheme.
Two special cases of are worth highlighting because of their
importance.
(i) A1 = 0, then it can be seen that we are covering in ef-
fect all possible graphs. Thus every graph leads to a CC
quantum secret sharing scheme.
(ii) B+CAt2 = 0. This corresponds to the situation where G
is bipartite. These secret sharing schemes are precisely
those arising from an [[n, 1]] CSS code.
If A2 = 0, then the access structure is trivial; the minimal
access structure contains a singleton set.
The framework as developed in [4] makes it possible to use
mixed states for sharing classical secrets. At the present it
is not clear how to include those schemes in the graph state
formalism, since graph states are by definition pure and they
lead to pure state quantum secret sharing schemes. Recall that
a pure state scheme is one in which a pure state is encoded
into a pure state. In a mixed state scheme a pure state could
be encoded into a mixed state. Such schemes could be more
efficient than the pure state schemes.
B. Quantum secrets
In this section, we use the graph state formalism to con-
struct QQ quantum secret sharing schemes for general access
structures. Every secret sharing scheme includes a step where
the dealer encrypts the secret before distributing the shares. In
[11, 12], this was broken down into the following. steps. In
the first step, the dealer prepares a graph state over the dealer’s
qubit and the players qubits. Then an ancilla qubit prepared
in the secret state is entangled with the dealer’s qubit. Then
the ancilla and dealer’s qubits are measured in the Bell basis
leading to an encoded teleporation onto the players’ qubits.
In this paper we simplify these steps by involving only one
additional qubit. We make use of the teleportation scheme to
encode into a quantum code using graph states, see [5, 7].
We illustrate this procedure through an example. Consider
the graph shown in Fig. 1. Pick any vertex of the graph, say
we pick 0. The dealer prepares this qubit in the secret state to
be shared. Then this qubit is entangled with the qubits in N0
using controlled-Z gates. Then we measure the dealer’s qubit
in the σx basis. If we measure 0, then the secret has been
encoded as desired, otherwise, we need to apply a correction
of the encoded Z on the state. The qubits are then distributed
to the players.
Consider the secret being encoded into ZsA|G \ 0〉, where
A = {4, 5, 7}. Then it can be verified that all the minimal au-
thorized sets given in Γ0,min satisfy both equations (6) and (7).
Γ0,min =
{
{1, 2, 7}; {1, 3, 5}; {1, 4, 6}; {2, 3, 4};
{2, 5, 6}; {3, 6, 7}; {4, 5, 7}
}
.(13)
Lemma 3. Let G be a bipartite graph with adjacency matrix
AG given by
AG =
[
0 P
P t 0
]
, where PP t = I. (14)
Then for any setD ⊆ B, whereB is in one of the bipartitions,
(i) Odd(Odd(D)) = D.
(ii) |Odd(D) ∩Ni| = 0 mod 2 for any i ∈ B \D.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) A general QQ secret sharing scheme from a
bipartite graph. All qubits except the dealer’s qubit are prepared in
the |+〉 state, while the dealer’s qubit (0) is prepared in the secret
state. Then we apply CZ gates along the edges of G. The dealer’s
qubit is then measured in the σx basis. A correction operator is ap-
plied if we measure one.
Proof. Let g ∈ Fn2 be such that supp(g) = D.
Then Odd(D) = supp(gAG) and Odd(Odd(D)) =
supp(gAGAG) = supp(g). Let h ∈ Fn2 be such that
supp(h) = Ni. Let h correspond to the ith row in AG. Note
that Odd(D) = supp(AGgt). To show that |Odd(D)∩Ni| =
0 mod 2, it is enough to prove that hAGgt = 0. This is zero
because h is orthogonal to all but the ithe column of AG.
Theorem 4. Let G be a bipartite graph whose adjacency ma-
trix AG is given by
AG =
[
0 P
P t 0
]
, where PP t = I. (15)
Then for every vertex i we can define a perfect QQ quantum
secret sharing scheme from G. The encoding for the quantum
secret sharing scheme is given by
E : a|0〉+ b|1〉 7→ a|G \ i〉+ bZsNi|G \ i〉. (16)
A generating set for the access structure Γi is given by the
following
Γi,gen =
{
D ∪Odd(D) \ i
∣∣∣∣ D ⊆ Vr|D ∩Ni| = 1 mod 2
}
,(17)
where Vr is the bipartition of vertices of G that does not con-
tain i. The encryption and recovery of the secret are as shown
in Fig. 2 and 3 respectively.
|ψ〉 • H
|G \ i〉 ZNi K
′
j
∣
∣ψ
〉
FIG. 2. Encrypting the secret state |ψ〉 for QQ secret sharing using
teleportation. The operator K′j = Xj
∏
k∈Nj\i
Zk is such that j ∈
Ni. It is applied only if the measurement outcome is 1.
|+〉 • H • |ψ〉
∣∣ψ
〉
KD U
′
D |G \ i〉
FIG. 3. Reconstructing the secret state |ψ〉 for QQ secret shar-
ing given an authorized set D as in equation (17). The opera-
tor KD =
∏
j∈DKj =
∏
j∈DXj
∏
k∈Odd(D)Zk and U
′
D =∏
j∈D Zj
∏
k∈Odd(D)\iXk .
Proof. We shall prove this theorem in parts. For convenience,
we shall ignore the normalization factors for quantum states.
(i) Encryption of the secret: Assume that the secret to be
encoded is |ψ〉 = a|0〉+ b|1〉. Then it can be easily ver-
ified that in Fig. 2, the state |ψ〉|G \ i〉 is transformed to
the following state prior measurement (up to normaliza-
tion):
|0〉(a|G \ i〉+ bZNi|G \ i〉) + |1〉 (a|G \ i〉 − bZNi|G \ i〉)
If we measure zero, then we get the desired state but if
we measure one, then we have to apply the correction
operator K ′j = Xj
∏
k∈Ni\i
Zk for any j ∈ Ni. This
operator anti commutes with the operator ZNi , but sta-
bilizes the state |G \ i〉, therefore it acts as a correction
operator to give the state in equation (16).
(ii) Recovery: Before we show that D ∪ Odd(D) \ i is
authorized, we need the following result. Note that
KD =
∏
j∈DKj , therefore supp(KD) = D ∪Odd(D)
and i ∈ supp(KD). Because of the fact PP t = I , the
element UD = XiU ′D =
∏
j∈D Zj
∏
k∈Odd(D)Xk ∈
S(|G〉). Let us write |G〉 as
|G〉 = |0〉|G \ i〉+ |1〉ZNi |G \ i〉,
Then it follows that
UD|G〉 = |1〉U
′
D|G \ i〉+ |0〉U
′
DZNi |G \ i〉.
Hence, U ′DZNi stabilizes |G \ i〉.
With respect to the recovery observe that the set D ∪
Odd(D) as in Eq. (17) satisfies the requirements of
Proposition 2, therefore if we trace through the circuit
given in Fig. 3, the state transforms as follows:
|+〉
∣∣ψ〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)(a|G \ i〉+ bZNi |G \ i〉)
c−KD−→ |0〉(a|G \ i〉+ bZNi |G \ i〉) +
|1〉(aKD|G \ i〉+ bKDZNi|G \ i〉)
H
−→ a|0〉|G \ i〉+ b|1〉ZNi|G \ i〉
c−U ′D−→ a|0〉|G \ i〉+ b|1〉|G \ i〉
= (a|0〉+ b|1〉)|G \ i〉
where we used the fact that U ′DZNi stabilizes |G \ i〉.
Thus D∪Odd(D) \ i is able to reconstruct the quantum
secret |ψ〉. The no-cloning theorem now implies that the
complement of this set is unauthorized.
(iii) Completeness of Γi,gen: Now we show that the ac-
cess structure as defined in Eq. (17) is complete in the
sense that every authorized set contains some element of
Γi,gen.
Assume that there exists some set A which is autho-
rized but not generated by Γi,gen. The complement of
5this set is unauthorized. Let this be denoted as B. Let
Ai = A ∩ Ni and Bi = B ∩ Ni, then Bi = Ni \ Ai.
Since B is unauthorized, it must have |Bi| = 0 mod 2
or Odd(Bi) 6⊆ B. (a) Suppose that it is the case that
|Bi| = 0 mod 2. Since PP t = I , |Ni| = 1 mod 2
and |Bi| = 0 mod 2, it follows that |Ai| = 1 mod 2.
If Odd(Ai) ⊆ A, then it is generated by Γi,gen, there-
fore, it must be the case that Odd(Ai) 6⊆ A. By
Lemma 3, Odd(Odd(i)) = Odd(Ni) = i it follows
that Odd(Bi) = Odd(Ai) \ {i}. Consider the set
C = Odd(Bi)\A. This has support only in the unautho-
rized set B. Then Odd(C) ∪ Bi has an odd neighbour-
hood which is given byOdd(Bi)\C and it lies entirely in
A. Further, the set A′ = A \ Odd(C) has an odd neigh-
bourhoodOdd(Bi) \C ∪ i. Thus the new set A′ ⊆ A is
an element of Γi,gen contrary to assumption that A is not
generated by Γi,gen.
(b) If on the other hand, |Bi| = 1 mod 2, then by exactly
the same argument but reversing the roles of A and B,
we see thatB is generated by an element of Γi,gen and is
therefore authorized. This would violate the no-cloning
theorem as A and B are disjoint. Thus it is not possible
for any authorized set to exist outside the access structure
generated by Γi,gen.
(iv) Perfectness of Γi,gen: We also need to show that this
scheme is perfect, namely, there are no unauthorized sets
which although unable to reconstruct the secret are still
able to extract some information about the secret. Be-
cause it is a pure state scheme by construction, it is suffi-
cient to show that the complement of an unauthorized set
is authorized. This can be shown using almost the same
argument as in (iii) but this time assuming that A and its
complement B are both unauthorized. In this case argu-
ing as (iii a), we would conclude that A ∈ Γi contrary to
the assumption that A is unauthorized or else arguing as
in (iii b) we would conclude that B is authorized. This
ensures that the QQ scheme constructed is perfect.
The access structure realized by this scheme is same as
the access structure realized by the quantum secret sharing
scheme using the approach of quantum error correcting codes
as the following result shows.
Corollary 5. LetQ be an [[n, 0]] CSS code, with the stabilizer
matrix,
S =
[
I P 0 0
0 0 I P
]
, (18)
where PP t = I . Then the [[n− 1, 1]] quantum code obtained
by puncturing the ith qubit realizes the QQ secret sharing pro-
tocol of Theorem 4.
Proof. It suffices to show that the quantum states in Eq. (16)
form a basis for the quantum code obtained by puncturing the
ith qubit. Without loss of generality we can assume that we
puncture the 0th qubit. Let P =
[
g
Q
]
, where (0|g) ∈ Fn2 and
supp(0|g) = Ni. Note that g 6= 0 because of the requirement
PP t = I . Then puncturing the ith qubit results in an [[n −
1, 1]] quantum code. The stabilizer matrix for this code is[
I Q 0 0
0 0 I Q
]
,
while the encoded operators are given by[
X
Z
]
=
[
0 g 0 0
0 0 0 g
]
.
Consider the state stabilized by S and Z . Its stabilizer matrix
is 
 I Q 0 00 0 0 g
0 0 I Q

 .
This matrix is equivalent to the following, through row trans-
formations, [
I Q 0 0
0 0 Qt I
]
,
which is precisely the stabilizer of the state
I⊗n/2−1H⊗n/2|G \ i〉. The state stabilized by S and X
on the other hand is I⊗n/2−1H⊗n/2ZNi|G \ i〉.
Remark 2. In this paper we have only considered secret shar-
ing schemes where the share distributed to each party is of the
same dimension as the dimension of the secret. Such schemes
are said to be ideal. The graph state framework has not been
used to study schemes which are not ideal. Such a need arises
because there are some schemes that are not ideal.
Our results make it possible to answer some questions re-
lated to the graph state formalism very easily as exemplified
by the following theorem.
Theorem 6. There do not exist any graph state QQ secret
sharing protocols for ((k, 2k − 1)) if k ≥ 4.
Proof. In [13], it was shown that every ((k, 2k − 1)) quan-
tum threshold secret sharing scheme is an [[2t− 1, 1, t]] quan-
tum MDS code. In [1], it was shown that there do not exist
any [[n, 1]] binary quantum MDS codes of length greater than
5. It follows therefore, there are no (pure state) QQ quantum
threshold schemes of length 2k−1 greater than 5, equivalently
k ≥ 4.
The existence of quantum threshold schemes was studied at
great length in [9]. Through the connection to quantum codes
we are able to shed light on this issue, immediately improving
upon the lower bound in [9, Corollary 4].
IV. CONCLUSION
We showed how to construct quantum secret sharing
schemes with arbitrary access structures using the graph state
formalism. These results also elucidate the connection be-
tween graph state framework and quantum secret sharing
schemes based on quantum codes [2, 4].
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